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Abstract— A conjugate code pair is defined as a pair of linear
codes such that one contains the dual of the other. The conjugate
code pair represents the essential structure of the corresponding
Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum code. It is argued that
conjugate code pairs are applicable to quantum cryptography in
order to motivate studies on conjugate code pairs.
Index Terms— conjugate codes, quotient codes, cryptographic
codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the invention of the first algebraic quantum error-
correcting code (QECC) by Shor [1] in 1995, the theory of
QECCs has been developed rapidly. The first code was soon
extended to a class of algebraic QECCs called Calderbank-
Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [2] and then to a more general class
of QECCs, which are called symplectic codes or stabilizer
codes [3], [4], [5].
In this paper, we focus on CSS codes. It is well-known
that this class of symplectic codes are useful for quantum
key distribution (QKD), at least, in theory. In particular,
Shor and Preskill [6] argued that the security of the famous
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD protocol could be proved
by evaluating the fidelity of quantum error-correcting codes
underlying the protocol.
The term ‘conjugate codes’ appearing in the title is almost
a synonym for CSS codes if one forgets about quantum
mechanical operations for encoding or decoding and pays
attention only to what can be done in the coding theorists’
universe of finite fields. This term was coined here so that
this issue would be more accessible to those unfamiliar with
quantum information theory.
Recently, the present author [7] proved the existence of CSS
codes that outperforms those proved to exist in the litera-
ture [2], and quantified the security and reliability of CSS-
code-based QKD schemes rigorously assuming ideal discrete
quantum systems. Although we have treated QKD in [7], the
CSS-code-based QKD scheme can be viewed as merely one
application of conjugate codes (CSS codes). For example, the
arguments in [7] also imply that conjugate codes can be used
as cryptographic codes that directly encrypt secret data as
will be elucidated in the sequel. Here, we remark that QKD
means techniques for sharing a secret key between remote
parties, and the shared key itself is not the secret message
that the sender wishes to send. A typical scenario is that after
sharing the key, the sender encrypts a secret data using the
key and sends it to the receiver and the receiver decrypts the
data using the shared key. The direct encryption is mightier,
and can be used as QKD if one wishes. Turning back to the
original motivation of (algebraic) QECCs, these codes deemed
indispensable for quantum computing since quantum states are
more vulnerable to errors or quantum noise, most notably to
decoherence. Among QECCs, CSS codes are said to be suited
for fault-tolerant quantum computing (e.g., [8] and references
therein).
The aim of this work is to enhance motivation to study
this class of codes. In particular, applications to cryptography,
which allow direct encryption, are emphasized. We remark
that a large portion of this paper is nearly a paraphrase of a
part of [7] though our description is slightly more general in
that we explicitly treat a general code pair (C1, C2) satisfying
a certain condition, which will be given shortly, whereas [7]
describes the result for the case where C1 = C2.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, conjugate
codes are introduced, and in Section III, CSS quantum codes
are explained. In Section IV, it is argued that conjugate code
pairs are applicable to quantum cryptography. General sym-
plectic codes, and quotient codes, are explained in Sections V
and VI, respectively. Sections VII and VIII, contain remarks
and a summary, respectively.
II. CONJUGATE CODES
We write B ≤ C if B is a subgroup of an additive group
C. We use a finite field Fq of q elements, and the dot product
defined by
(x1, . . . , xn) · (y1, . . . , yn) =
n∑
i=1
xiyi (1)
for vectors in Fnq . We let C⊥ denote {y ∈ Fnq | ∀x ∈ C, x·y =
0} for a subset C of Fnq .
We mean by an [[n, k]] conjugate (complementary) code
pair or CSS code pair over Fq a pair (C1, C2) consisting of an
2[n, k1] linear code C1 and an [n, k2] linear code C2 satisfying1
C⊥2 ≤ C1, (2)
which condition is equivalent to C⊥1 ≤ C2, and
k = k1 + k2 − n. (3)
If C1 and C2 satisfy (2), the quotient codes C1/C⊥2 and
C2/C
⊥
1 are said to be conjugate. The notion of quotient codes
was introduced in [9], and will be explained in Section VI.
The goal, in a long span, is to find a conjugate code
pair (C1, C2) such that both C1/C⊥2 and C2/C⊥1 have good
performance. If the linear codes C1 and C2 both have good
performance, so do C1/C⊥2 and C2/C⊥1 . Hence, a conjugate
code pair (C1, C2) with good (not necessarily a technical term)
C1 and C2 is also desirable.
III. CALDERBANK-SHOR-STEANE CODES
The complex linear space of operators on a Hilbert space
H is denoted by L(H). A quantum code usually means a
pair (Q,R) consisting of a subspace Q of H⊗n and a
trace-preserving completely positive (TPCP) linear map R on
L(H⊗n), called a recovery operator. The subspace Q alone
is also called a code. Symplectic codes have more structure:
They are simultaneous eigenspaces of commuting operators on
H
⊗n
. Once a set of commuting operators is specified, we have
a collection of eigenspaces of them. A symplectic code refers
to either such an eigenspace or a collection of eigenspaces,
each possibly accompanied by a suitable recovery operator. In
this section and the next, we assume H is a Hilbert space of
dimension q, and q is a prime (but see Section VII-E). Then,
Fq = Z/qZ. We fix an orthonormal basis (|i〉)q−1i=0 of H.
In constructing symplectic codes, the following basis of
L(H⊗n) is used. Let unitary operators X,Z on H be defined
by
X |j〉 = |j − 1〉, Z|j〉 = ωj |j〉, j ∈ Fq (4)
with ω being a primitive q-th root of unity (e.g., ei2pi/q). For
u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Fnq , let Xu and Zu denote Xu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
Xun and Zu1⊗· · ·⊗Zun , respectively. The operators XuZw,
u,w ∈ Fnq , form a basis of L(H⊗n), which we call the Weyl
(unitary) basis [15]. We have the commutation relation
(XuZw)(Xu
′
Zw
′
) = ωu·w
′−w·u′(Xu
′
Zw
′
)(XuZw), (5)
for u,w, u′, w′ ∈ Fnq , which follows from XZ = ωZX . It
is sometimes useful to rearrange the components of (u,w)
appearing in the operators XuZw in the Weyl basis as follows:
For u = (u1, . . . , un) and w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Fnq , we denote
by [u,w] the rearranged one
(
(u1, w1), . . . , (un, wn)
)
∈ Xn,
where X = Fq × Fq . We occasionally use another symbol N
for the Weyl basis:
N[u,w] = X
uZw
1When the number of elements of a code C ⊆ Fnq is qk , it is called an [n, k]
code. Readers unfamiliar with coding theory are referred to [9, Section 2] or
standard textbooks such as [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
and
NJ = {Nx | x ∈ J}, J ⊆ X
n.
An obvious but important consequence of (5) is that XuZw
and Xu′Zw′ commute if and only if u · w′ −w · u′ = 0. The
map
([u,w], [u′, w′]) 7→ u · w′ − w · u′ (6)
is a symplectic bilinear form, which we refer to as standard.
A CSS code is specified by two classical linear codes (i.e.,
subspaces of Fnq ) C1 and C2 with (2).2 Coset structures are
exploited in construction of CSS codes. We fix some set of
coset representatives of the factor group Fnq /C1, for which
the letter x is always used to refer to a coset representative in
this section, that of C1/C⊥2 , for which v is used, and that of
F
n
q /C2, for which z is used. These may be written as
x ∈ Fnq /C1,
z ∈ Fnq /C2,
v ∈ C1/C
⊥
2
where ∈ is in abuse as usual. Put k1 = dimC1, k2 =
dimC2, and assume g1, . . . , gn−k2 form a basis of C⊥2 , and
h1, . . . , hn−k1 form a basis of C⊥1 . We assume k1 is larger
than n− k2.
The operators
Zh1 , . . . , Zhn−k1 , Xg1 , . . . , Xgn−k2 , (7)
which generate the so-called stabilizer of the CSS code,
commute with each other, so that we have simultaneous
eigenspaces of these operators. Specifically, put
|φxzv〉 =
1√
|C⊥2 |
∑
w∈C⊥
2
ωz·w|x+ v + w〉 (8)
for coset representatives x, z and v. Then, we have
Zhj |φxzv〉 = ω
x·hj |φxzv〉, j = 1, . . . , n− k1
and
Xgj |φxzv〉 = ω
z·gj |φxzv〉, j = 1, . . . , n− k2.
It can be checked that |φxzv〉, x ∈ Fnq /C1, z ∈ Fnq /C2, v ∈
C1/C
⊥
2 , form an orthonormal basis of H⊗n. In words, we have
qk1+k2−n-dimensional subspaces Qxz such that
⊕
x,zQxz =
H
⊗n and Qxz is spanned by orthonormal vectors |φxzv〉,
v ∈ C1/C⊥2 , for each pair (x, z) ∈ (Fnq /C1) × (Fnq /C2).
The subspaces Qxz , (x, z) ∈ (Fnq /C1) × (Fnq /C2), are the
simultaneous eigenspaces of the operators in (7), and form a
CSS code.
In [7], we have treated the case when C1 = C2 = C⊥ with
a code C. In this case, C is necessarily self-orthogonal3 by
(2). We will consistently use k to denote the logarithm of the
dimension of Qxz , viz.,
k = k1 + k2 − n = logq dimCQxz. (9)
2Our code pair (C1, C2) often appears as (C1, C⊥2 ) in the literature [2],[6], [9]. Our choice would be more acceptable to coding theorists because
good (not necessarily a technical term) codes C1 and C2 result in a good
CSS code while the performance of C⊥2 seemingly has no direct meaning.
3A subspace C with C ≤ C⊥ , which is equivalent to ∀x, y ∈ C, x·y = 0,
is said to be self-orthogonal (with respect to the dot product).
3Decoding or recovery operation for a CSS quantum code
can be done as follows. If we choose a set Γi of coset
representatives of Fnq /Ci (i = 1, 2), we can construct a
recovery operator R for Qxz so that the code (Qxz,R) is
NJ(Γ1,Γ2)-correcting in the sense of [16], where J(·, ·) is
defined by
J(Γ1,Γ2) = {[x, z] | x ∈ Γ1 and z ∈ Γ2}. (10)
In fact, Qxz is NJ(Γ′
1
,Γ′
2
)-correcting with
Γ′1 = Γ1 + C
⊥
2 and Γ′2 = Γ2 + C⊥1 . (11)
This directly follows from the general theory of symplectic
codes [4], [5], [17, Proposition A.2] on noticing that the
operators in the Weyl basis that commute with all of those
in (7) are XuZw, u ∈ C1, w ∈ C2 (see also Sections V and
VI).
IV. CSS CODES AS CRYPTOGRAPHIC CODES
Schumacher [18, Section V-C], using the Holevo bound,
argued that if a good quantum channel code is used as a
cryptographic code, the amount of information leakage to the
possible eavesdropper is small. In this section, we will apply
Schumacher’s argument to CSS codes.
A. Quantum Codes and Quantum Cryptography
Suppose we send a k-digit secret information V + C⊥2 ∈
C1/C
⊥
2 physically encoded into the state |φXZV〉 ∈ QXZ,
where we regard X,Z as random variables, and assume (X,Z)
are randomly chosen according to some distribution PXZ.4
Once the eavesdropper, Eve, has done an eavesdropping,
namely, a series of measurements, Eve’s measurement results
form another random variable, say, E. We use the standard
symbol I to denote the mutual information (in information
theory).
According to [18, Section V-C],
I(V;E|X = x,Z = z) ≤ Sxz (12)
where Sxz is the entropy exchange after the system suffers a
channel noise N , Eve’s attack E , another channel noise N ′,
and the recovery operation R = Rxz for Qxz at the receiver’s
end. Let us denote by Fxz the fidelity of the code (Qxz,R)
employing the entanglement fidelity Fe [18]. Specifically,
Fxz = Fe
(
piQxz ,RN
′EN
)
where piQ denotes the normalized projection operator onto Q,
and BA(ρ) = B
(
A(ρ)
)
for two CP maps A and B, etc. Then,
by the quantum Fano inequality [18, Section VI], we have
Sxz ≤ h(Fxz) + (1 − Fxz)2nR (13)
where h is the binary entropy function and R =
n−1 logq dimQxz. Combining (12) and (13) and taking the
averages of the end sides, we obtain
I(V;E|XZ)
≤ Eh(FXZ) + (1− EFXZ)2nR
≤ h(EFXZ) + (1− EFXZ)2nR, (14)
4The probability distribution of a random variable Y is denoted by PY.
where E denotes the expectation operator with respect to
(X,Z). Hence, if 1−EFXZ goes to zero faster than 1/n, then
I(V;E|XZ) → 0 as n → ∞. We have seen in [7] that the
convergence is, in fact, exponential for some good CSS codes,
viz., 1−EFXZ ≤ q−nE+o(n) with some E > 0. This, together
with (14), implies
I(V;E|XZ) ≤ 2q−nE+o(n)[n(E +R)− o(n)], (15)
where we used the upper bound −2t log t for h(t), 0 ≤ t ≤
1/2, which can easily be shown by differentiating t log t (or
by Lemma 2.7 of [19]). Thus, we could safely send a secret
data v+C⊥2 provided we could send the entangled state |φxzv〉
in (8) and the noise level of the quantum channel including
Eve’s action were tolerable by the quantum code.
In the above scheme, the legitimate sender, Alice, and
receiver, Bob, should share the random variables XZ, say,
by sending them through a public channel that is free from
tampering of malicious parties (but see Section IV-C). In
particular, we assume Eve can possibly observe XZ without
tampering them as in the literature on quantum key distribu-
tion.
B. Reduction to Cryptographic Code
In [7], borrowing the idea of [6], we have reduced the above
cryptographic scheme to the BB84 protocol. We now explain
that this reduction argument also shows that conjugate code
pairs (CSS codes) can be used as cryptographic codes.
The above scheme is simply summarized as ‘choose XZ =
xz randomly, and encode the secret data into the basis
(|φxzv〉)v of the quantum code QXZ.’ We would encounter
several difficulties and drawbacks in implementing the above
scheme in this form. Among others, the state |φxzv〉 defined in
(8) is entangled in general, and therefore the above scheme is
hard to implement with the current technology. To overcome
this problem, we use Shor and Preskill’s observation that the
probabilistic mixture of |φxzv〉 with x, v fixed and z chosen
uniformly randomly over Fnq /C⊥2 is given as
1
|C⊥2 |
∑
z
|φxzv〉〈φxzv |
=
1
|C⊥2 |
∑
w∈C⊥
2
|w + v + x〉〈w + v + x|, (16)
which can be prepared as the mixture of states |w + v + x〉
with no entanglement.5 Then, clearly, if Alice sends the secret
data v encoded into the state in (16) with x chosen randomly
according to PX (the marginal distribution of PXZ), the in-
equalities deduced in the previous subsection, in particular,
the bound on the information leakage to Eve in (15), remain
true. Thus, we can send secret data safely by the following
scheme.
Conjugate-Code-Based Cryptographic Code. Alice sends
a k-digit secret information V + C⊥2 ∈ C1/C⊥2 physically
encoded into the state in (16) where X = x is chosen randomly
according to some distribution PX.
5A proof of (16) is given in Section VII-F.
4In this case, Alice and Bob should share X = x. We remark
the random variable Z, the states |φxzv〉 and the recovery
operator Rxz are fictitious in that they do not appear in the
above reduced cryptographic code, but they proved useful for
demonstrating the security. These need only exist in theory,
and need not be implemented in practice.
Up to now, we have fixed our attention on proving the
security. However, we should ensure reliable transmission.
Namely, the probability of disagreement between Alice’s data
V and Bob’s data V′, which should be the result of decoding
the cryptographic code, must be reasonably small. For the
conjugate-code-based (CSS-code-based) cryptographic code,
we employ the following decoding principle. The receiver
performs a decoding algorithm for the coset code x+C1 that
correct errors in Γ1, a set of coset representatives of Fnq /C1.
The algorithm is the obvious modification of a decoding
algorithm for the linear code C1. In the next subsection, we
will see that a CSS quantum code with high fidelity results
in a secure and reliable cryptographic code, where a reliable
cryptographic code means that with small decoding error
probability. Note that if PX(x) = 1 for some x, we do not
have to send X (see the next subsection).
C. Evaluating Fidelity
Note that the underlying CSS codes (before the reduction)
has the fidelity EFXZ which is bounded by
1− EFXZ ≤ PA(J(Γ
′
1,Γ
′
2)
c), (17)
where J , Γ′1 and Γ′2 are as in (10) and (11). The right-hand side
of (17) can be written as Pr{ξ /∈ Γ′1 or ζ /∈ Γ′2}, and hence
we have 1−EFXZ ≤ Pr{ξ /∈ Γ′1}+Pr{ζ /∈ Γ′2}, where ξ and
ζ are random variables such that the distribution of [ξ, ζ] is
given by PA. The equality holds in (17) if |Γ1| = qn−k1 and
|Γ2| = qn−k2 (namely, if they are complete systems of coset
representatives). This follows from that the code is NJ(Γ′
1
,Γ′
2
)-
correcting and that the fidelity of an NJ -correcting symplectic
code is 1 − PA(J) for a channel A : L(H⊗n) → L(H⊗n),
where the probability distribution PA is associated with A in
the manner described in [7], [17] (see also Section V). In the
present context, A = N ′EN . An important fact is that the
right-hand side of (17) is smaller than Pr{ξ /∈ Γ′1}, which is
the decoding error probability when the quotient code C1/C⊥2
is used as a conjugate-code-based cryptographic code. Hence,
by bounding the fidelity of the underlying CSS quantum codes,
we automatically obtain bounds on the security and reliability
simultaneously.
There are subtleties on (17). This fidelity bound is true for a
general TPCP map A : L(H⊗n)→ L(H⊗n) if PXZ is uniform.
This is because (17) is based on Corollary 4 to Theorem 3 in
[17] or the alternative reasoning in [7, Appendix A] and any
of these assumes the distribution of the syndrome (X,Z) is
uniform. A desirable situation in the reduced cryptographic
code is that the entropy of PX is small. In particular, if
PX(x) = 1 for some x, or (17) is true for such a random
variable X for other reasons, we do not need the public channel
to send X. This is possible if the map A = N ′EN is known to
the legitimate participants of the protocol as explained below.
The history of information theory suggests it would be
reasonable to treat first the tractable case where E is known
to the legitimate participants (and A = E⊗n) to pursue the
fundamentals of the issue of transmitting private data (cf.
[20], [21]). Then, we can interpret the above argument as
indicating the existence of a good cryptographic code (a kind
of random coding proof). Namely, we can single out the best
index x̂ such that EZFx̂Z ≥ EXZFXZ, where EY denotes the
expectation operator with respect to a random variable Y.
Replacing the original random variable X with that whose
probability concentrates on x̂, we have a protocol that does
not require transmission of information X through an auxiliary
public channel.
Still, it would be desirable to remove the assumption that
the legitimate participants know A. That is, universal codes
that do not depend on the channel characteristics are desir-
able. Regarding this issue, we make a small step forward.
It seems difficult to construct universal cryptographic codes
without transmission of auxiliary information for the com-
pletely general class of channels. However, this is possible
with our conjugate-code-based cryptographic code if the class
of A is restricted to those such that EZFxZ does not depend
on x. This situation occurs if, e.g., A has the form A :
ρ 7→
∑
u,w∈Fnq
P (u,w)XuZwρ(XuZw)† with a probability
distribution P on (Fnq )2. This condition is equivalent to that A
is ‘Weyl-covariant’: NxA = ANx, where Nx : ρ 7→ NxρN †x,
x ∈ Xn (see, e.g., [17, Section 2.5]). More generally, the
situation occurs if A has the property
A(XuρX−u) = XuA(ρ)X−u
for any ρ ∈ L(H⊗n) and u ∈ Fnq . This condition is equivalent
to
〈l − u|A(|i− u〉〈j − u|)|m− u〉 = 〈l|A(|i〉〈j|)|m〉
for any i, j, l,m, u ∈ Fnq , which reads ‘the channel looks the
same if we translate the basis (|i〉)i to (|i− u〉)i.’
V. GENERAL SYMPLECTIC CODES
In this and next sections, the order q of the finite field
Fq is not necessarily a prime. In this section, we digress
to explain how general symplectic codes are defined and
how CSS codes are obtained from the general definition. The
2n-dimensional linear space F2nq over Fq equipped with the
standard symplectic form
fsp((x1, z1, . . . , xn, zn), (x
′
1, z
′
1, . . . , x
′
n, z
′
n))
=
∑
i
xiz
′
i − zix
′
i
which has already appeared in (6), plays a crucial role in
algebraic QECCs. We can define the dual L⊥sp of L by
L⊥sp = {y ∈ F2nq | ∀x ∈ L, fsp(x, y) = 0}. Let us call
a subspace L with L⊥sp ≤ L an fsp-dual-containing code
or a dual-containing code (with respect to the symplectic
form fsp). Then, we have a quantum code whose performance
is closely related to that of the classical code L. The code
is called a symplectic (quantum) code with parity check set
(y1, . . . , yn−k), where y1, . . . , yn−k ∈ F2nq form a basis of
5L⊥sp , or a symplectic code with stabilizer NL⊥sp . Here,
N : u 7→ Nu is Weyl’s projective representation [15] of F2nq
(the same as in Section III).
Suppose An,k is the ensemble of [2n, n + k] fsp-dual-
containing codes over Fq. We can regard them [n, (n +
k)/2] additive codes over X = F2q if we pair up
the coordinates of any word (x1, z1, . . . , xn, zn) to have
((x1, z1), . . . , (xn, zn)) ∈ Xn. We can associate with an
[n, (n+k)/2] fsp-dual-containing code a set of dk-dimensional
subspaces of H⊗n, which can be used for quantum error
correction [3], [4], [5]. Namely, we have the next lemma,
which is a slight reformulation of the original one [3], [4].
Lemma 1: Suppose a subspace L ∈ An,k and a set J of
representatives of cosets of L in F2nq are given. Then, we
have a qk-dimensional subspace of H⊗n that works as an NJ˜ -
correcting code with a suitable recovery operator, where J˜ =
J + L⊥sp = {x+ y | x ∈ J, y ∈ L⊥sp}.
For a proof, see [4] or, e.g., [22], [17]. Roughly speaking,
given a set of operators F , a quantum code being F -correcting
or a code corrects ‘errors’ in F means that it recovers any state
in the code subspace perfectly after the state suffers ‘errors’
belonging to F [16]. The precise definition of F -correcting is
not requisite for evaluating the performance of quantum codes.
Indeed, the next fact is enough to treat symplectic codes [17]:
If we properly define the performance measure of symplectic
codes, it equals the probability PA(J˜). The performance
measure is the entanglement fidelity averaged over the whole
syndromes, which was already used in Section IV.
A CSS code is a symplectic code with stabilizer NL⊥sp such
that L⊥sp has the form L⊥sp = {[u,w] | u ∈ C⊥2 , w ∈ C⊥1 }
with some C1 and C2. In this case, L = {[u,w] | u ∈ C1, w ∈
C2}, so that L⊥sp ≤ L can be written as C⊥2 ≤ C1, the
requirement we have posed.
VI. QUOTIENT CODES
Now, we turn to the realm of finite fields or algebraic coding
theory. In [9], the notion of quotient codes was introduced to
explain QECCs. The aim of [9] was to exhibit the essence,
at least, for algebraic coding theorists, of algebraic quantum
coding. A quotient code of length n over Fq is an additive
quotient group C/B with B ≤ C ≤ Fnq . In the scenario of
quotient codes in [9], the sender encodes a message into a
member c of C/B, chooses a word in c according to some
probability distribution on c, and then sends it through the
channel. Clearly, if C is a J-correcting in the ordinary sense,
C/B is (J + B)-correcting (since adding a word in B to
a code-coset does not change it). A conjugate-code-based
cryptographic code effectively means a quotient code in this
scenario. A conjugate-code-based cryptographic code may be
said to be an error-correcting code that can protect information
from eavesdroppers, and hence may be called a cryptographic
error-correcting code.
Lemma 1 may read that if L is a dual-containing code
with respect to fsp, and the quotient code L/L⊥sp is J˜ -
correcting, then the corresponding symplectic quantum code is
NJ˜ -correcting. Turning our attention to the CSS code specified
as above with C1, C2, the quotient code L/L⊥sp has the form
C1/C
⊥
2 ⊕ C2/C
⊥
1 . Thus, the CSS code Qxz in Section III is
NJ(Γ′
1
,Γ′
2
)-correcting with Γ′1 = Γ1+C⊥2 and Γ′2 = Γ2+C⊥1 .
In particular, the CSS code has large fidelity if both C1/C⊥2
and C2/C⊥1 have small decoding error probabilities. This is
the ground where the goal described in Section II stems from.
It might be said that the structure of quotient codes were
inherent in quantum error-correcting codes and CSS-code-
based cryptographic codes.
VII. REMARKS
A. Model of Eavesdropping
A measurement is modeled as a completely positive (CP)
instrument whose measurement result belongs to a finite or
countable set (e.g., [23], [24], [25], [26], [27]). The specific
model employed in this work is the same as in [7] and as
follows.
We assume a TPCP map A : L(H⊗n)→ L(H⊗n) represents
the whole action of Eve (plus the other environment). This
means that there exists a decomposition (CP instrument) {Ai}i
such that A =
∑
iAi, where Ai are trace-nonincreasing CP
maps, and when the initial state of the system of the whole
sent digits is ρ, Eve obtains data E = i with probability
TrAi(ρ) leaving the system in state Ai(ρ)/TrAi(ρ). Here,
the decomposition may depend on the other random variables
available to Eve.
A minor comment follows. Let the random variable E′
denotes Eve’s measurement result on the whole sent digits.
Then, the random variable E above mentioned has more
information than E′ since E includes the data relevant to the
other environment. However, there is no harm in considering
E as Eve’s data for the purpose of proving the security.
B. Related Information Theoretic Problems
In [20], [21], information theoretic problems related to ours
are treated. These and the present work or [7] share the goal of
secure transmission of private data, but their specific purpose
in [20], [21] is to establish coding theorems on the best
asymptotically achievable rates. Our codes are linear codes
while theirs lack such a helpful structure and are hard to
conceive aimed at practical use.
The quantum theoretical models treated in the literature
above mentioned can be regarded as generalizations of that
of [28]. What are called conjugate-code-based cryptographic
codes in the present work essentially fall in the class of coding
systems in [28].
C. Wiesner’s Conjugate Coding
The term ‘conjugate coding’ appeared in the pioneering
work on quantum cryptography [29], where the idea of encod-
ing secret information into quantum states, more specifically,
into conjugate bases, was proposed. This idea is still alive
in CSS-code-based cryptographic codes or QKD schemes.
However, this is a problem of modulation in the language of
communication engineers. Thus, our meaning of ‘conjugate’
is different from, though related to, that of [29].
6D. QKD Protocol
The BB84 QKD protocol as treated in [30], [6] or its vari-
ants is, roughly speaking, the CSS-code-based cryptographic
code plus a scheme for estimating the noise level, where the
noise includes the effect of eavesdropping. Mainly due to the
scheme for noise estimation, the protocol needs public commu-
nication. We have used the dichotomy of cryptographic codes
and estimation schemes in analysis of the QKD protocol [7],
and have focused more on cryptographic codes in the present
work.
E. Non-prime Alphabet
Let q = pm with p prime. We have assumed m = 1
in Sections III and IV. When m > 1, a conjugate code
pair (C1, C2) over Fq is still useful for quantum coding and
cryptography. This is because elements of Fq can be expanded
into Fmp using dual bases in such a way that TrFq/Fp xy =∑
i xiyi, where (x1, . . . , xm) is the representation of x with
respect to one basis and (y1, . . . , ym) is that of y with respect
to the dual [31]. Applying these representations to (C1, C2),
we obtain a conjugate code pair over Fp. This follows easily
from [32, Theorem 1], or [33, Theorem 1].
F. Proof of (16)
The left-hand side can be written as
1
|C⊥2 |
2
∑
w,w′∈C⊥
2
∑
z
ωz·(w−w
′)|x+ v + w〉〈x + v + w′|
and we see
∑
z ω
z·(w−w′) vanishes whenever w 6= w′.6 Hence,
we have (16).
G. Other Comments
We take this opportunity to make corrections to related
works of the present author [7], [34], [9]. (a) Ref. [7]: On
p. 8313, line 5, ‘Γ˜n = Γn + 1n’ should read ‘Γ˜n = Γn +
{0n, 1n}’. (b) Ref. [9]: On p. 453, right column, 5th line
from the bottom, ‘basis of L’ should read ‘basis of L⊥sp’.
(c) Ref. [9]: On p. 453, right column, 4th line from the
bottom, ‘NL’ should read ‘NL⊥sp ’. (d) Ref. [34]: On p. 6, right
column, line 16, the period should be removed, and ‘With’ in
the subsequent line should be decapitalized.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Conjugate codes were introduced without referring to
Hilbert spaces so as to be more accessible to algebraic coding
theorists. The bridge between the coding theorists’ universe,
the vector space over a finite field, and quantum mechanical
worlds that are represented by Hilbert spaces is Weyl’s pro-
jective representation N of F2nq ≃ Xn, N : Xn ∋ x 7→ Nx.
Applicability of conjugate codes to cryptography was argued.
A class of good conjugate code pairs will be given in future
works [33], [35], [36].
6This follows by an easy direct calculation, but may be seen as a basic
property of characters (e.g., [12]): the map f : z 7→ ωz·(w−w′) is a character,
and f(z) 6= 1 for some z if w 6= w′.
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